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Commercial Law
INSURANCE
J. Denson Smith*
In the law of insurance unmodified by legislation a warranty
is contractual in nature, it must be literally fulfilled, and its
materiality is not open to question. The untruth or nonfulfillment of a warranty in any respect, without regard to whether
the insurer is prejudiced thereby, will render the policy voidable. A representation, on the other hand, is not part of the contract but is a statement made by way of inducement to contract.
A false representation, whether innocent or fraudulent, will
render a policy voidable, provided it is material. Immaterial
representations are without effect. If the insurer, being truly
advised of the fact misrepresented, would not have contracted
or would have contracted but only at a higher rate, the representation will be deemed material, otherwise not. With reference to
the requirement of falsity, a question calling for an expression
of opinion must be answered only to the best of the applicant's
knowledge or belief. Questions concerning the state of the applicant's health or asking whether he has had some specific
disorder fall into this category. For example, if the insured
gives a negative answer to the question, "Have you ever had
any disease of the heart?" and his answer is true on the basis
of his knowledge, then, of course, the insurer cannot complain if
the insured was then suffering from an unknown but fatal heart
ailment. With reference to the requirement of materiality, the
failure on the part of an insured to disclose minor ailments or
illnesses of a temporary character, as, for example, malaria, or
indigestion, is counted generally as immaterial. The theory is
that an insurer being advised of such ailments would not be
thereby influenced in determining to accept the risk or in fixing
the premium. On the other hand, a true warranty by the insured
that he had never had any disease of the heart, or malaria, for
that matter, would be entirely different. To protect insureds
against the often unconscionably harsh operation of warranties,
most state legislatures, including Louisiana's, have adopted statutes converting all warranties into representations in the absence
of an intent to deceive on the part of the insured. This legisla[78]
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tion purports to provide that a warranty as such will remain a
warranty only when there is an intent to deceive. Otherwise, it
will amount to a representation. Presumably the law relating
to representations was not being changed. Thus, Act 52 of 1906,
Louisiana's original statute on the subject, provided in part that
"all statements ... made by the insured shall, in the absence of
fraud, be deemed representations and not warranties." In the
first place, although this language might be taken as providing
that in the presence of fraud, all statements will be warranties,
this point of view has never prevailed. That is, such a statute
does not convert representations into contractual terms merely
because fraud is present. When Louisiana adopted its Insurance
Code, the language of the 1906 act was retained, as it had been
retained in an earlier amendment, but to it was added: "The
falsity of any such statement shall not bar the right to recovery
under the contract unless such false statement was made with
actual intent to deceive or unless it materially affected either
the acceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed by the insurer.-"
Although this seems to say that a false statement made with
actual intent to deceive will render the contract voidable without regard to its materiality, there is no basis for believing that
the Legislature had any such purpose in mind. Error is an essential part of invalidating fraud.1 On the other hand, this language seems clearly to say that a false and material statement
will bar the right to recovery irrespective of an intent to deceive. Such a rule states the generally accepted law relating to
representations. There have been some expressions in the cases
indicating that a representation must be fraudulent in order to
give rise to a power of avoidance but subject to the holdings
involving expressions of opinion or the failure to disclose minor
ailments, the cases have indicated that a false representation of
a material fact is all that is required to render a policy voidable.
An opinion rendered during the last term, however, casts some
doubt on this position. In Gay v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co.,2 the
insured, in answering certain questions, denied that he had ever
been afflicted with any heart or circulatory disease. The evidence showed that he had been informed as a child that he was
a "blue baby." Under the questioning of a physician after he
had been stricken fatally he seems to have given a factually ac*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CiviL Coma art. 1847 (1870).
2. 96 So.2d 497 (La. 1957).
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curate account of his medical history. The court observed, however, that there was no showing that he ever understood the
meaning of his condition. There was also some evidence that he
might not have believed what he had been told. He lived to be
thirty-five and made his living as a truck driver. At any rate,
the court held against the insurer. In construing the provisions
of R.S. 22:619B, it was concluded that in the adoption of the
Insurance Code there was no intent to change the existing law
which was to the effect that a "misstatement must have been
made fraudulently or with the intent to deceive, - that is [or]
knowing it to be untrue and believing it to be material to the risk
[or of such nature that it would be only reasonable to assume
that he must have believed that it was material]." The case
that seems to have been principally relied on for this view was
Carroll v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.8 An examination of it shows that
the insured failed to disclose that he had consulted a physician
friend, more or less informally, for an ailment that they both
thought was simple indigestion. The court held against the
insurer and stated the controlling principle to be that "a false
statement . . . will not vitiate a policy, unless the false statement is fraudulent or material." The indication was that the
statement was neither fraudulent nor material. That is, if the
insurer had been advised that the insured had consulted a physician for a simple case of indigestion this information would
not have influenced its conduct with respect to the issuance of
the policy. In the instant case, the fact that the insured had
been a "blue baby" was clearly material. But, since the view
of the court was that it had to be fraudulent as well, or more
particularly, that the insured had to have an intent to deceive
the insurer concerning a fact that he knew or must have known
to be material, judgment was rendered against the company. On
the basis of this construction, the legislation in question, instead
of merely converting a warranty into a representation in the
absence of fraud, imposes the additional requirement that a representation, beyond being false and material, must also be made
with an intent to deceive. This, of course, rests the test of materiality not only on the influence of the fact on the insurer, but
also on the knowledge or belief of the insured. It is arguable
that the reason why an applicant for insurance is not required
to disclose the existence of minor ailments or consultations with
physicians concerning them is that he is not supposed to know
3. 168 L.

953, 123 So. 638 (1929).
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that such information would be of any consequence to the insurer. Yet, basically, the justification for the existence of a
power of avoidance in a party who contracts on the basis of a
false representation is that, if he had known the truth, he would
not have contracted or would have contracted only on a different basis. That is, he is entitled to relief because his consent
is given in error. Under the Gay case this test seems to become
inapplicable to the life, health, or accident insurer unless there
is an actual intent to deceive on the part of the insured. It
seems to preclude the possibility of finding that an innocent but
material false representation may bar recovery. Error is not
enough; it must have been induced by fraud. This may be a
reasonable step. Perhaps it is a way of telling insurers to rely
on their own investigations and examinations and not on answers given by applicants for insurance. Of course, the view
may be taken that the decision is entirely consistent with the
cases involving expressions of opinion in that when the insured
denied that he had ever been afflicted with any heart or circulatory disease he did so believing in his own mind that this was
the fact with the result that, being called upon to express an
opinion concerning his condition, he had expressed a truthful one
and so discharged the burden resting upon him. The chief difficulty with this explanation is that it tends to tax the credulity
to believe that a person, knowing himself to have been a "blue
baby," would not know that this indicated some sort of heart or
circulatory disease. And if this be the explanation, then the
broad statement of the applicable rule would appear to have been
unnecessary.
It may or may not be significant that at the same term of
court recovery was denied to the beneficiary of a life policy because the insured had failed to disclose in answer to appropriate
questions that he had been treated for tuberculosis for about
seven years prior to the issuance of the policy. This earlier case,
Roche v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,4 would not be significant
except for the fact that the court carefully reviewed the subject
of warranties and representations and seemed fully to support
the proposition that a false and material representation will
be a bar to recovery, irrespective of the presence of an actual
intent to deceive on the part of the insured. It disposed of a case
chiefly relied on by the plaintiff by saying that it "applied the
4. 232 La. 168, 94 So.2d 20 (1957).
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well settled rule of our jurisprudence that questions to an applicant for insurance concerning diseases or consultations are
to be understood as referring to appreciable disorders, and not
to inconsequential illnesses of a temporary character, though attended by a physician; so that although the answers may be
knowingly untrue, the policy will not be thereby avoided unless
the said representations are material to the risk." This deals
with a failure to disclose known ailments on the basis of materiality, not on an intent to deceive. As a result there appears
to be some question concerning whether these two cases are entirely consistent in their statement of the applicable principle.
In Christo v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 5 the court found that the
failure of a finance company, in effecting collision insurance
coverage for the purchaser of a car, to advise the agent that
although the car was being bought in the name of one person it
was actually to be used by a minor twenty years of age, was not
material. This was based on the proposition that the omnibus
clause extended coverage to the actual user as an additional
insured. For the same reason the court reached the conclusion
that there was no actual intent to deceive the insurer. Although
the court seemed to treat the case as involving an application of
R.S. 22:619 (A) dealing with misrepresentations, the facts seem
to present a case of concealment. No difference in result would
follow, however, because a fact concealed must be material and
withheld in bad faith to render a policy voidable. Here the state
of mind of the applicant is controlling. It would be wholly unreasonable to put on him the burden of knowing what information the insurer might want when no questions are asked on the
subject.
The case of Nichols v. Iowa Mutual Ins. Co.6 involved an
interpretation of two exclusions under the provisions of a policy
covering theft of insured automobiles. Acting under instructions
by the Louisiana buyer, the seller in Chicago engaged two men
to drive the two insured vehicles to Louisiana. One driver was
later apprehended in Miami and the other in Las Vegas. It was
held that the purchaser had not voluntarily parted with "possession" of the vehicles within the terms of the exclusion and that
the drivers were not in the insured's "service or employment."
They were found, instead, to be in the category of independent
5. 232 La. 28, 93 So.2d 682 (1957).
6. 232 La. 856, 95 So.2d 338 (1957).
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contractors. Although there is no uniformity in the cases dealing
with provisions of this kind, the instant holding is considered as
being in harmony with their basic purpose. The surrender of
possession provision seems designed to exclude cases involving
obtaining by false pretenses or other wrongful scheme or device
and the exclusion of theft by persons in the insured's service or
employment rests on the constant exposure of the vehicle to such
theft. It has been held not to cover theft by a service station employee, for example, because the service station is an independent contractor performing a service for, but not in the service of,
the insured. The same theory seems properly applicable to the
instant facts.
In Hammack v. Resolute Fire Ins. Co., 7 a collision insurer was

compelled to pay the insured the value of the car as a total loss
plus a twenty-five percent penalty and attorney's fees. The insurer's conduct was extremely questionable and inexcusable. It
apparently attempted to rely on a cash settlement evidenced by
certain forms the insured had signed and the alleged delivery of
a check to its affiliated finance company, as mortgagee, and at
the same time to claim that the insured had rejected a delivery
of the vehicle after the repairs had been made, some ten months
after the loss. The court's conclusion that the only consent ever
given by the insured was for the repair of the vehicle was supported by the evidence. The unreasonable delay in discharging
this obligation gave full support to the judgment.
A few additional cases under this heading involved nothing
of sufficient importance to justify comment.
7. 96 So.2d 612 (La. 1957).

